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Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Education. Ed. by Günter Zöller and
Robert B. Louden. Transl. by Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, Robert B. Louden, Holly
Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöller, and Arnulf Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011. [The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in
Translation]. xvi, 597 pp. ISBN 978-0-521-18121-1.
Kant touched on various aspects of the question of human nature in much of his
writing, though he dealt with specific issues pertaining to the study of the human
being only in a limited number of pieces. Much of this material came up in one
form or another in Kant’s course, Vorlesungen über Anthropologie, that he taught
on a regular basis during most of his academic career (1772–1796), although his
writings on this subject matter span an even longer period of time. The volume
under review contains seventeen pieces which deal more or less directly with the
study of human nature and which were published between 1764 and 1803, start-
ing with the pre-critical period and ending shortly before Kant’s death; it unites
writings that are scattered throughout the academy edition.
More than almost any other volume of the Cambridge Edition, the present
one highlights some of the advantages and disadvantages of the organizational
criteria of this series. There is obviously much benefit to be derived from having
Kant’s writings grouped topically, rather than just having them ordered chro-
nologically, regardless of their subject matter, as was, at least in part, the prac-
tice of the academy edition. The difficulties arise from the fact that selection
along topical lines is often anything but easy. Kant’s writings do not always fit
neatly into the academic disciplines of his days nor into the areas delineated by
his three Critiques, and many a short piece touches on different unrelated topics.
Any grouping of Kant’s works will thus be to some extent arbitrary, and will be
saddled by inevitable drawbacks. In the present case, the problems stem from
the fact that the science of human nature or the study of the human being are not
clearly defined fields. The editors were not unaware of this; Louden notes that
Kant’s study of human nature is “an eclectic venture revealing multiple origins,
competing concerns and goals, as well as multiple application possibilities”
(228). A number of more or less closely related themes are dealt with in most of
the pieces on human nature, though there is much variation involved, and the
emphasis differs from piece to piece a great deal. Most common is perhaps the
notion of providing “principia for the improvement of morality” (1). However,
even leaving aside Kant’s ethics in the strict sense of the word, this may mean
anything from improving the morals of a young person to furthering the morality
and freedom of the whole of humankind. These two goals are not unrelated, but
while the former may exhaust itself in offering simple practical advice pertaining
to life style, the latter has to do with the greater scheme of things and is often
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connected with the heuristic idea of human progress, which in its turn may or
may not be coupled with reflections on teleology and purposiveness. And the
basic idea of improving morality may or may not be linked to Kant’s explicitly ex-
pressed intention of contributing to a field that was useful for life, not only for
school. As a consequence, the writings included in the present volume are
marked more by a family resemblance than by any strictly definable standards.
The editors’ claim that the volume offers a “complete documentation” of Kant’s
writings “on the human being from an anthropological, biological, historical,
and pedagogical point of view” (xiii) is perhaps overly optimistic; there are writ-
ings that have been omitted but could have been included, while others that do
figure here seem to be out of place. The editors themselves admit that Some Re-
marks on Ludwig Heinrich Jakob’s Examination of Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours of
1786 do not fit in squarely (xiii). Indeed, one wonders if they could not have been
included in the volume on Religion and Rational Theology (1996) instead. There,
Some Remarks would have stood next to What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in
Thinking, another piece in which Kant contributed to the so-called “pantheism
dispute”, an acrimonious clash among German philosophers over Lessing’s al-
leged pantheism.
In his “General Introduction” (1–17), Louden very usefully divides the writ-
ings in this volume into three groups, anthropology, history, and education,
though in the main body of the volume the translations follow in a straightfor-
ward chronological sequence. Under “anthropology” Louden not surprisingly
counts above all Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View of 1798, a
book that is largely though loosely based on Kant’s university lectures; this, inci-
dentally, is the only large work included in this volume. However, Louden’s
account begins with the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime
of 1764, a piece that is usually seen as an expression of Kant’s pre-critical views on
aesthetics and ethics. Nevertheless, though this writing could well have been
included in a volume on aesthetics, it is by no means misplaced here, given that
for the most part it does deal with “anthropological” themes such as the differ-
ences between the genders as well as among nationalities and races. What is not
entirely clear is why Kant’s own notes and additions to this essay (GSE, AA 20:
1–102) are not included in this volume as well; this is not explained, the reader is
merely directed to the publication of a part of the additions in the Cambridge Edi-
tion volume Notes and Fragments (2005, 1–24).
Further included under the heading “anthropology” are five very brief pieces
on medical topics, starting with the Essay on the Maladies of the Head of 1764, and
further comprising Kant’s Review of Moscati’s Work On the Corporeal Essential Dif-
ferences Between the Structure of Animals and Humans (1771), A Note to Physicians
(1782), On the Philosophers’ Medicine of the Body (1786), and From Soemmerring’s
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On the Organ of the Soul (1796). These writings deal with the study of the human
being only in a general sense, since Kant was here mainly concerned with clarify-
ing the relationship between the academic disciplines of philosophy and medi-
cine. However, the fact that he sought to establish a connection between these
two fields, thus opting for a psychosomatic approach while distancing himself
from a strictly physiological one, does make these articles relevant to the study of
human nature.
The last group of writings that Louden subsumes under “anthropology” con-
sists of three essays on the races, Of the Different Races of Human Beings (1775),
Determination of the Concept of a Human Race (1785), and On the Use of Teleologi-
cal Principles in Philosophy (1788). These differ markedly from Kant’s other works
that have been discussed so far, as they form no part of a “pragmatic anthropol-
ogy” but belong to the very physiological branch of which Kant was mostly highly
critical (6). Louden and later again the translators of these pieces in their respect-
ive introductions note that there is a racist tone or under-tone to these essays
(“prejudices of an era”, 3), though Louden defends Kant by pointing to the fact
that Kant was adverse to using racial criteria to justify the subjugation of peoples.
In spite of the fact that Kant regarded the goal of civilizing savages as highly de-
sirable, such an end did not, according to him, legitimize the violation of human
rights (9–10). The bulk of the three pieces on the races can only be of a historical
interest. Though it does raise conceptual and methodological questions, it mainly
involves detailed discussions of highly technical issues such as the role of germs
(Keime) in the development of the different human races, and it is intended as a
contribution to the then raging debate between the proponents of “monogen-
eticism” and those of “polygeneticism”, i.e., to an argument over the question
whether the human species has only one origin or multiple ones. However,
especially the last piece, On the Use of Teleological Principles, is also philosophi-
cally relevant. Two years before the appearance of the Critique of the Power of
Judgement, Kant here defended the legitimacy of the concept of purposiveness in
science, stressing that it should serve as a heuristic principle, and distinguishing
between different kinds of teleology. In passing, Kant also endorsed Karl Leon-
hard Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy which appeared in Teutscher
Merkur in 1786 and which did much to popularize Kant’s philosophy in Germany.
This essay, which deals with at least three different topics, thus amply illustrates
the difficulties of neatly classifying Kant’s writings. And the editors are faced
with a dilemma: include the essay with the third Critique, because that is where
its philosophical importance lies, or place it alongside the two articles on race,
because, after all, the greatest part of it does deal with the natural history of the
human species. Obviously, either solution is possible, and they are both open to
criticism.
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Under the heading “history” Louden includes Kant’s three pieces on the phi-
losophy of history, namely his Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan
Aim (1784), his Review of J. G. Herder’s Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of
Humanity (1785), and the Conjectural Beginning of Human History (1786). As
Louden explains, in these writings Kant took up with considerable reservations
the Enlightenment’s notion of human progress. Unlike some of the more hopeful
advocates of this idea, Kant did not think that automatic improvement was to be
expected. For him humankind would have to labour hard for its own advance-
ment, and there was no guarantee on the part of nature that we would move in the
direction of greater freedom and a more advanced state of morality. Indeed, Kant
insisted on the difficulties that a natural being would have to overcome when
attempting to become a truly moral subject: by resorting to concepts such as “un-
sociable sociability” Kant pointed to the contorted path humankind would have
to follow, more unwittingly than knowingly, more forced on human beings by na-
ture than freely chosen by rational actors. Given that many of these basic notions
appear in a number of other writings by Kant, the reader is left wondering, why,
e.g., Kant’s essay An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? was left out
of this volume. Unfortunately, the editors offer no explanation, though in their
notes they do provide a fairly extensive list of Kant’s writings that are relevant to
his philosophy of history (488).
The two pieces on education included in this volume, the Essays Regarding
the Philanthropinum (1776/1777) and the Lectures on Pedagogy, published by
Kant’s younger colleague Friedrich Theodor Rink in 1803, contradict the writ-
ings on the philosophy of history in one very important respect. As Louden him-
self points out, the essays on history assume that human progress is the unin-
tended result of selfish actions, while the writings on education show how “the
species achieves progress through the intentional development of its own capac-
ities and talents” (15). Nevertheless, there is common ground, provided by the
idea that the non-sectarian, cosmopolitan attitudes and moral values that were
to be inculcated into pupils would ultimately contribute to the perfection of hu-
mankind.
For the sake of completeness it should be mentioned that the volume also
includes the last writing that Kant himself published, namely the Postscript to
Christian Gottlieb Mielcke’s Lithuanian–German and German–Lithuanian Diction-
ary of 1800. This usually neglected, roughly one page long piece can be subsumed
under “anthropology” insofar as Kant here makes a link between language and
culture, arguing that the former preserves valuable historical information. He also
shows great respect towards the linguistic and cultural rights of ethnic minorities,
and he fittingly ends this piece by advocating the preservation and even culti-
vation of the Lithuanian and Polish languages in Prussia.
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The present volume, produced with great care, includes all the editorial ma-
terial that one has come to expect from the Cambridge Edition. There is the usual
German–English and English–German glossary, very informative introductions
and endnotes which provide background information on the circumstances of the
composition of each piece, on the particulars of the original publication, on the
impact of the given writing, as well as brief summaries of the main ideas. The
translations are almost all new for this edition, though some of them do owe a
debt to earlier attempts, as the translators are quick to admit. As is usual in this
series, the aim is to provide a literal yet readable translation. Special difficulties
in the present volume arise in the translations of the writings on the races; the
biological terminology employed by Kant is dealt with by resorting to extra lin-
guistic notes and, indeed, the list of the original German words below the text is
longer here than it is elsewhere.
Of course, translation being an art rather than an exact science, not all the
translations are equally felicitous. One may start by pondering how accurate it
is to render Kant’s title Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht by the straight-
forward Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Translating the German
“Anthropologie” by “anthropology” is well established practice and may seem un-
objectionable. However, although these word are obvious cognates, they do differ
significantly in their respective ordinary language uses. Only the expression
“physical anthropology” offers no special problems for the translator. Otherwise,
the English word, which is best translated into German as Ethnologie, has a far
narrower connotation, and hence fails to cover much of what the German word
means; normally, one would, e.g., not label any reflections on the mind-body
problem (as they become manifest in Kant’s discussion of the connection be-
tween medicine and philosophy) by the English word “anthropology”. One can
thus meaningfully say “study of human nature […] from an anthropological point
of view” only in English; in German, the equivalent phrase would be a pleonasm.
At least equally problematic is a translation of Kant’s seemingly very peculiar use
of “pragmatic” in this context. The issue is confused already by the fact that in his
works on ethics, Kant opposed pragmatic to moral, while in his Anthropologie
he opposed it to physiological, explicitly defining it as what a free-acting being
makes of herself (231). And though last mentioned may be in accordance with the
meaning of the ancient Greek word, such a connotation is more or less inexistent
today, not least of all because the philosophical movement of Pragmatism has
massively affected the usage of this term and its relatives. Unfortunately, translat-
ing “pragmatisch” with “cultural” or even “anthropological” and thus rendering
the title of Kant’s Anthropologie as Study of Human Nature from an Anthropologi-
cal Point of View would not be wholly satisfactory either, since it would com-
pletely miss the dimension of being useful for life, which the erudite reader will
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easily infer from her knowledge of the etymology of the Greek word. Perhaps fu-
ture translators will come up with a more suitable solution.
Vilem Mudroch: Zürich; vilem@philos.unizh.ch
Johannes Keienburg: Immanuel Kant und die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft. [KSEH
164.] Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2011. 206 Seiten. 978-3-11-025930-8.
Johannes Keienburg stellt in seinem Buch den vielfältigen Begriff der Öffentlich-
keit in Kants kritischer Philosophie in fünf Kapiteln dar. „Obwohl Kant den
Begriff Öffentlichkeit in seinem schriftlichen Werk kein einziges Mal verwendet“
(184) hält Keienburg diesen Begriff für ein zentrales Element von Kants kritischer
und politischer Philosophie. Ausgangspunkt des Buches ist eine semantische
Analyse des gegenwärtigen Sprachgebrauchs des Öffentlichkeitsbegriffs und sei-
ner systematischen Verortung in Kants kritischer Philosophie. Im ersten Kapitel
werden verschiedene Öffentlichkeitsebenen und ihre Bedeutungsfelder in Kants
politischer Theorie ausdifferenziert, und wird besonders das Publizitätsprinzip
berücksichtigt, das Kant in seiner Friedensschrift als Prinzip des öffentlichen
Rechts bezeichnet. Keienburg betont zu Recht, dass das Publizitätsprinzip als
transzendentale Formel des öffentlichen Rechts eine negative und eine positive
Version enthält. Als negatives Prinzip besagt es, dass all jene politischen Maxi-
men, die sich nicht veröffentlichen lassen, ungerecht sind. Die positive Dimen-
sion besagt, dass alle Maximen, die der Publizität bedürfen, um ihren Zweck
nicht zu verfehlen, gerecht sind (vgl. ZeF, AA 08: 386). Die positive Version des
Publizitätsprinzips braucht für ihre Erfüllung eine faktische Öffentlichkeit. Wäh-
rend bei der negativen Formel ein einzelnes Subjekt die Frage zu beantworten
vermag, ob seine Maxime veröffentlicht werden kann, verlangt die positive Ver-
sion des Publizitätsprinzips eine faktische Öffentlichkeit, um ihren Zweck nicht
zu verfehlen (vgl. 26).
Keienburg vertritt die Hauptthese, dass sich der Ursprung des kantischen
Öffentlichkeitsbegriffs nicht in Kants politischer Theorie, nicht im erwähnten Pu-
blizitätsprinzip, sondern vielmehr in seiner theoretischen und praktischen Philo-
sophie befindet (vgl. 184). Das zweite, dritte und vierte Kapitel des Buches zielt
darauf ab, dies durch eine umfassende Analyse der kantischen theoretischen und
praktischen Philosophie zu zeigen. Keienburgs These, dass Kants theoretische
Vernunft im Wesentlichen eine öffentliche Vernunft ist, wird im zweiten und drit-
ten Kapitel des Buches durch zwei Hauptargumente gerechtfertigt: Erstens sei
der öffentliche Gebrauch der Vernunft für die Entwicklung der menschlichen
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